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I. INTRODUCTION

Since 1902 the Bureau of Reclamation has been a
major player in Western water development. Its
dams and ancillary facilities are now found in
every Western state, supplying water for a variety
of purposes to millions of acres and millions of
people, as well as hydroelectric power that
facilitates water delivery and groundwater pumping.
A number of constraints are converging to spell
the apparent end to the Bureau's traditional role
in constructing large facilities to store and
convey surface water. Most of the West's major
rivers are now fully controlled. Many prime dam
sites have already been used, and using those that
remain encounters stiff opposition. Costs have
escalated and benefits are regarded more
skeptically than formerly, but increasing subsidies
in order to justify more projects is difficult in
the face of federal budgetary deficits,
environmental criticism, and opposition by
non-reclamation states. Inter-regional transfers,
such as exporting Columbia River basin water to the
Colorado River Basin, once promised to be the next
major phase of both Western water development and
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Bureau of Reclamation activity, but the promise has

faded rather dramatically in the last decade or
SO.

Although the Bureau has a healthy backlog of
authorized but uncompleted projects, the justification for many of these is so shaky that realists
inside and outside the agency don't expect them to
be built, at least in originally

planned form.

Instead, most foresee a steep decline in Bureau

construction

activities after the Central Arizona

Project, and that portion of the Central Utah
Project now under construction, are completed
in the early 1990's. (These two projects have for
the past several years accounted for the lion's
share of Bureau construction appropriations.) The
Reagan

Administration

funding the

has proceeded full bore with

CAP and the CUP but has, like its

predecessor, generally been more tight-fisted with
other projects, especially ones authorized but not
yet under construction. Mere mention of requiring
local beneficiaries to contribute to the costs of
the latter up front (so-called "cost-sharing" -- a
Carter Administration proposal that the Reagan
Administration made its own, although not consistently) may be

tantamount to

killing them, given

the tenuous economics behind them.
What, then, will become of the Bureau? Does it
3

have a meaningful role to play in the new era of
wiser, more efficient management of Western water?
Can it transfer its political and engineering
skills, historically used to enlarge the pie of
Western water, to a new era that seems to require
recarving the pie? In the process of recarving the
pie, what is the Bureau's responsibility regarding
the use of water from existing projects, including
transfers to new places or kinds of use?

General Reference Sources on the Bureau
1.

Michael Robinson, Water for the West: The

Bureau of Reclamation 1902-1977 (Public Works
Historical Society, 1979).
2.

Alfred R. Golze, Reclamation in the United

States (1961).
3.

W. Warne, The

Bureau of Reclamation (1972).

4.

Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert (forthcoming,

August 1986, from Viking-Penguin).
(The first is a semi-official history of the
agency and contains a useful bibliography. The
second and third are generally uncritical, at times
even fawning, in their praise of the agency and its
works. The fourth is a distinctly revisionist and
often sharply critical analysis.]
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Sources on Reclamation Law
Still the best work, though increasingly
outdated, is Joseph Sax's chapter in Volume 2

(pp. 111-291) of the Waters and Water Rights
treatise (R. Clark ed., 1967, with a 1978 Supplement by M. Byron Lewis).
In recent years the law reviews have published
a steady stream of articles on reclamation law.
The best single article, though considerably
outdated, is Frank Trelease's "Reclamation Water
Rights," 32 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 964 (1959). Another
useful publication, though purely descriptive
rather than analytical, and also now badly outdated
(a new version has been in the works for a decade
or more,) is Federal Reclamation and Related Laws
Annotated

(3 vols., U.S. Dep't of the Interior,

1972) that covers 1902 through 1966.
For a modern (and critical) economic analysis
of reclamation policy, see E. Phillip LeVeen,
"Reclamation Policy at a Crossroads," 19 Bull. of
Inst. of Gov't Studies, U. Cal. Berkeley, no. 5
(Oct. 1978).
For a detailed view of the law and policy
surrounding a large and controversial Bureau
project, see "Special Task Force Report on the San
Luis Unit" (U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 1978)
5

(Westlands Water District on the West side of the
San Joaquin Valley), and "Westlands Water
District-Legal Questions," 85 I.D. 298 (1978).

II. A Thumbnail History of the Bureau
John Wesley Powell is often described as the
father of reclamation, though he did not advocate a
federal public works agency like the Bureau. But
Powell's ideas did lay some groundwork for the
emergence of the Bureau, with the Reclamation Act
of June 17, 1902, 32 Stat. 388, codified at 43
U.S.C. § 391 and scattered other sections in 43
U.S.C.
The early projects, authorized by the Secretary
of the Interior exercising power delegated by
Congress in the Reclamation Act, see 43 U.S.C. §
411, were almost exclusively for agricultural
irrigation and, perhaps because the federal subsidy
involved was so limited (merely an interest free
loan to be repaid over ten years) were frequently
financial and social failures. A series of acts,
studies, and more acts followed that overhauled the
program, forgiving debts, stretching out the
repayment terms, and manifesting a steady search
for a formula that would make the program
politically, if not purely economically, viable.

In the decade of the 1930's, that formula was
located, based on new engineering techniques that
allowed construction of giant dams, beginning with
Hoover on the lower Colorado, to serve multiple
purposes including flood control, storage, electric
power generation, and water for municipal and
industrial uses as well as agriculture. Other big
projects followed, and the decade closed with
passage of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939, 43
U.S.C. §§ 485-485K, that greatly loosened
restrictions on repayment and other terms. This
decade saw the liberal vision of the New Deal
united with Jefferson's agrarian myth and "can-do"
engineering hubris to move the program into high
gear, and nary a dissenter was to be found.
The post World War II era, through the
mid-1960's, was the Bureau's golden age, as its
projects multiplied and it for the most part
successfully resisted incursions by the other major
federal dam building agency, the Corps of
Engineers, into its Western turf. But, dissenters
began to appear. (Raymond Holey, New Deal brain
truster, became the earliest prominent critic, on
mostly economic grounds, with publication of What
Price Federal Reclamation? in 1955.) The
successful fight against the Echo Park dam in

Dinosaur National Monument and its tradeoff, the
damming of Glen Canyon, in 1956, and the even more
heated battles over dams in the Grand Canyon in the
1960's were the modern turning points in Bureau
evolution. Its future was seriously constricted by
limitations on interbasin transfers grafted onto
the Central Arizona Project Act in 1968, and its
critics bolstered by the report of the National
Water Commission in 1973 (a report commissioned by
Congress in companion legislation to the CAP Act),
that recommended drastic reduction of federal
subsidies for water development.
Today, the Bureau is besieged by environmentalists, fiscal conservatives, easterners fighting
for a larger share of the national park barrel, as
well as critics from within its own traditional
western constituencies -- farmers, cities and
industry -- who are increasingly, and publicly, at
war with each other over the allocation of the
Bureau's subsidies. These interests are sometimes
joined by the western states themselves, some of
whom have occasionally challenged Bureau policies
and practices.

III. The Future

- New Projects and New Directions

It is difficult to generalize about the
8

Bureau's future because its past has been
characterized by a flexibility, remarkable for a
government agency, to adapt to local circumstances
and conditions in designing and building water
projects.

Although

its original (and still core)

constituency was agriculture, for example, the
Bureau readily moved, without a backward look, to
build projects to serve municipal, industrial,
flood control and other interests. It even
participated in building a coal-fired power plant
in the early 1970's to supply electricity for the
Central Arizona Project. Its genius at helping
create local political coalitions and then
tailoring projects to satisfy them could lead it to
continue to play a major role in Western water
development.
Nevertheless, many of the factors discussed
above that argue against major new projects are
seemingly intractable. Moreover, the Bureau's
historic expertise, and its bias, is pouring
concrete, and not promoting efficiency, conjunctive use of groundwater and surface water, and
other techniques on the cutting edge of water
policy in the 1980's. Today, for example, well
over half of the Bureau's personnel are still in
construction-related functions.
9

This bias toward what is euphemistically called
in the trade "structural solutions" has tended to
permeate Bureau attitudes toward "non-structural"
methods of meeting the real water needs of the
West. The Bureau did not, for example, strenuously
resist groundwater regulation in Arizona largely
because,

r

suspect, once the CAP is completed there

are practically no more local projects to be built
in the state. But the Bureau has vigorously
opposed groundwater regulation in California's
Central Valley because the undammed North Coast
rivers still beckon invitingly for dams. (Indeed,
the Bureau has never charged local valley
beneficiaries of its surface water projects in
California's Central Valley for the recharge of
groundwater resulting from the Bureau's importation
of new supplies of surface water, arguing the
improvement is merely the "unavoidable result" of
such surface water imports. In Arizona, on the
other hand, Bureau projects like the CAP and, even
as early as the 1930's, the San Carlos project have
called for conjunctive management of ground and
surface water.)
Similarly, the Bureau has attempted,with mixed
success, to move into cloudseeding research and
applications, probably largely because it offers
10

some new opportunities to build projects to capture
and deliver the "new" water produced. Its
cloudseeding programs have been attacked as too
promotional for this very reason.
This points up the central problem: One could
foresee a future for the Bureau in such areas as
data gathering, providing technical assistance
for on-farm management to improve irrigation
effectiveness, and undertaking demonstration
projects for groundwater recharge, conjunctive
use management and the like. Indeed, this shift in
objectives is the kind of thing institutions with a
self-preservation instinct grab onto to survive in
a greatly altered milieu. But in the Bureau's case
there is room to doubt whether it will occur. For
one thing, the agency itself may not be content
with such a less glamorous role. Taming wild
rivers surely offers more challenge and romance
than improving irrigation efficiency. For another,
it may be doubted whether the Bureau has the
ability to play such a role effectively. Employees
of the Bureau who show interest or expertise in

non-structural solutions have historically tended
to be isolated or even driven out because their
approach was perceived, probably correctly, as
undercutting the agency's traditional mission to
11

build projects regardless of efficiency concerns.
The result is a substantial vacuum of talent on
this approach within the agency. Third,
environmental groups and other critics of the
Bureau are likely to oppose any such attempted
transformation because in their view a leopard
doesn't readily change its spots. In short, though
the Bureau's historic bias toward large
capital-intensive construction projects seems
simply ill-suited to current realities, prospects
for change are not rosy.
If the Bureau does successfully adapt to
this seemingly inescapable modern reality of no
major new projects, it will be a very different
Bureau; much smaller, for one thing, and with a
much altered range of expertise. History teaches
that government agencies don't easily disappear,
but there is at least a reasonable prospect that
the Bureau will become largely irrelevant as a
force in water resource development and management
in the West.
Having said all this, some parts of history
does suggest that the Bureau can function as a
leader for the Western states in promoting better
water management. Many of the western states'
early water rights adjudication systems were
12

patterned after the model water code designed by
Morris Bien, a Bureau attorney, at the turn of the
century. Indeed, many early stream adjudications
in the Western states were (much to the chagrin of
many Indian tribes) prompted by the Bureau, as it
needed secure water rights in order to undertake
new project construction. And the Bureau does have
close relationships with some western water
management entities, especially irrigation and
other special water districts. Significantly, in
some cases the Bureau is closer to these districts
than the relevant state agency is. But whether
this history and these relationships are enough to
overcome the obstacles identified above to such a
shift in orientation is still anybody's guess.
One cautionary note. Although the scenario
that seems most realistic, even compelling, today
is for no new major projects, the pendulum could
always swing back toward the Bureau's traditional
approach. Some are now theorizing, for example,
that the "greenhouse effect" caused by a buildup of
carbon dioxide and other gases in the upper
atmosphere could reduce the average flow in the
already over-allocated Colorado River by 25%. If
that happens, the basin faces some difficult
choices; most likely, between substantial
13

elimination of irrigated agriculture or importation
of water from outside the Basin. Economics seems
to favor the former, given low crop values
throughout most of the Basin. But politics has a
squirrely way of ignoring economics, and a revival
of Columbia Basin export plans could be in the
offing. At the moment, however, that still seems
unlikely.

IV. The Future -- Managing Existing Projects
There is another important side to the Bureau
- its role with respect to existing projects, as
the water users served by these projects themselves
try to adapt to the emerging emphasis on more
efficient management. The Bureau is implicated
here in a variety of ways.

A. Transfers of Reclamation Project Water
Rights
First, and perhaps foremost, is the question of
transfers. Both the law and the Bureau's practice
are murky. See, e.g., Meyers & Posner, "Market
Transfers of Water Rights: Toward an Improved
Market in Water Resources" (Legal Study #4 for the
National Water Commission, 1971) pp. 18-25, 47, and
Appendix 3. The possibility that transfers may be
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subject to an independent review by the Bureau even
when permissible under state law, and may be
prohibited by federal law if they involve the
transfer from one type of use to another or for use
outside the federal project boundaries, undoubtedly
has a chilling effect on such transfers. Indeed,
federal law has been used as a basis for
challenging them, see, e.g., John F. Long v. Salt
River Project, No. 83-2397 (D. Ariz., filed
Dec. 12, 1983), but many questions remain to be
answered.
Both the law and, especially, Bureau policy
ought to be clarified. If transfers are to be
encouraged, there remain a couple of important
questions. First, should the Bureau try to
recapture some or all of the federal financial
subsidy designed to assist agriculture, when
agricultural water is transferred to another use
(e.g., municipal and industrial) not as heavily
subsidized under reclamation law? See, e.g.,
Wilson, "Reclamation Subsidies and Their
Present-Day Impact," 1982 Ariz. St. L.J. 297. Such
farm-to-city-or-industry transfers are becoming the
rage in parts of the West, reflecting bottom line
economics on the relative worth of Ag versus M & I
water. Second, should the Bureau attempt to
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regulate such transfers in order to protect other
values, such as preservation of local agricultural
communities and instream flows and other
environmental amenities?
An important part of this problem is the entire
relation of federal and state law vis-a-vis
reclamation project water rights. See generally
Kelley, "Staging a Comeback -- Section 8 of the
Reclamation Act," 18 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 97 (1984).
The Supreme Court, like the Bureau itself, has
not steered a steady course on such questions.
See generally California v. United States, 438
U.S. 645 (1978), and compare

Ide v. United States,

263 U.S. 497 (1924), with Nevada v. United States,
463 U.S. 110 (1983). The current view seems to be
that the federal government's "ownership" of water
rights is "at most nominal," Nevada v. United
States, 463 U.S. at 126, at least in a contest
between the private beneficiary and the federal
government, and even a federal reservation of a
contractural right of control may not be sufficient
to defeat a water right based on state law that is
inconsistent with the contract. United States
v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d 851 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied

sub nom Pyramid Lake Paiute

Tribe v. Truckee-Carson Irr. Dist., 464 U.S. 863
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(1983).
California v. United States at first seemed to
end the dispute over state control of reclamation
projects, even though the Bureau did not seem to
get the message, see, e.g., the Ninth Circuit's
decision after remand, reported at 694 F.2d 1171
(9th Cir. 1982). But numerous troublesome issues
remain, such as the seemingly independent federal
"appurtenancy" and "beneficial use" requirements of
§ 8 of the reclamation act, the need to determine
whether state law is inconsistent with
congressional directives applicable to specific
projects, and what now seems to be a singular but
very important exception to state control, on the
Colorado River, based on its "unique size and
multi-state scope." See California v. United
States, 438 U.S. at 665, n.19, 668-69, n.21, 674,
676, 678 n.31.
As this last example suggests, one of the
difficulties in generalizing about reclamation law
is its variegated character. All Bureau projects
except the earliest ones have been authorized by
statute, and the same ad hoc coalition building
that persuaded Congress to approve such projects
led to the incorporation of variable objectives and
restrictions in these authorizations. From a legal
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perspective, these projects are like snowflakes -seemingly fungible but endlessly variable when
scrutinized. Organic reclamation law remains
important, but is often subject to modification
when viewed in relation to a specific project
authorization.
B. Other Legal Questions
As long as the Bureau retains some control over
federal reclamation projects and the water they
produce, numerous other questions are likely to pop
up and demand resolution. "Excess lands" problems
arising out of the notorious 160 acre acreage
limitation were reduced by the relaxation of the
limitation adopted by Congress in the Reclamation
Reform Act of 1982, 43 U.S.C. § 390aa-zz. But
while this act brought many beneficiaries into
compliance, it also tightened controls and
strengthened the federal mechanisms (if not the
federal resolve) for policing and enforcing
compliance with respect to those landowners still
subject to the relaxed limitations. The Reagan
Administration has asked Congress to water down
these enforcement mechanisms, but so far Congress
has not shown any stomach to revisit the matter.
Other questions likely to arise concern the
Bureau's obligations with respect to the
18

groundwater/surface water interface alluded to
earlier, and potential conflicts between the
Bureau's duty to comply with federal regulatory
laws like the Endangered Species Act and its
obligations to carry out projects as authorized by
Congress. See, e.g., Carson-Truckee Water
Conservancy Dist. v. Watt, 549 F.Supp. 704
(D. Nev. 1982), aff'd as modified, 741 F.2d 257
(9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 105 S.Ct. 1842
(1985).
C. Maintenance and Rehabilitation of Existing
Proiects
Another likely battleground is over money
needed to repair and maintain existing projects.
Bureau project facilities today average over 50
years of age, and concerns over dam safety were
fueled rather dramatically by the collapse of the
Teton Dam in 1976. The Bureau has understandably
seized on such concerns as a lever for continuing
the flow of federal water project dollars. Repair
is not as heady as building new projects from
scratch, but it might be a living for a beleagured
Bureau, especially because repair tends to excite
less environmental opposition.
Here too, however, cost-sharing is likely to
have an impact, for federal insistence upon more
19

local contributions could change rather
dramatically the real price of water produced by
reclamation projects, and for this reason is
stoutly resisted. At this point, the likely result
appears to be compromise, with locals contributing
something, but the proportion depending upon ad hoc
negotiations influenced by the strength of local
coalitions and how well-placed their congressional
delegations are.
A related problem that has emerged in recent
years involves degradation of water quality
from the operation of reclamation (as well as
other) irrigation projects. Waterfowl-destroying
selenium contamination in the Westlands Water
District in California made headlines a while
back, and similar problems probably exist at some
other projects. Every irrigation project sooner or
later creates a drainage problem, the old saw goes,
and salinity buildup has been the bane of irrigated
agriculture throughout history. The bill for
dealing with these problems is beginning to come
due, and answers, at least easy ones, are not
readily available.
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CONCLUSION
One who believes in Occam's Razor (the simplest
solution is the best) has to be tempted to
recommend that the Bureau get out of the water
project and management business. The Western
states, having clamored for "local control" of
water all these many years, have always regarded
the Bureau, or at least the Bureau's money and
engineering skills, as an essential ingredient in
that local control. But that historic reality no
longer obtains. Scarcely anyone except the most
starry-eyed supply-side economist (and, apparently,
the President) believes the federal government is
going to climb out of huge budget deficits any time
soon, and in any event more and more people appear
to believe that heavy federal financing of local
water projects is not a wise investment.
Anyone who has worked around politics, however,
especially in as sensitive an area as water, knows
that the simplest theoretical solution is almost
never realistic. I therefore don't think I'm going
very far out on a limb by saying that the Bureau
will probably continue to exist, and will continue
to play some role in Western water use. But it
will be a much reduced role under almost any
conceivable scenario. The key question, yet
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unanswered, is whether its role will facilitate or
constrain the Western states as they yield to the
reality of a static-sized pie and begin to recarve
it. Although efforts to improve efficiency in
water management largely by non-structural means
cuts against the Bureau's grain, its historic
sensitivity to prevailing political winds should
not be discounted.
The key to resolving this dilemma might be
found not in the Bureau or its congressional
supporters, but in the Western states themselves.
If they send the message that they want to
transform the Bureau into a supporter of new water
management realities (and that they want to
exercise more control over reclamation projects,
and the local water districts that benefit from
them, to achieve this end), the transformation has
a fair chance of success.
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